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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Foreign Missile and Space Analysis  
Center (FMSAC)

1. This memorandum is for the information of the  
Director of Central Intelligence.

2. FMSAC was created as the result of general  
dissatisfaction with the efficiency and competence of compo-  
nents of the Intelligence Community concerned with the analysis  
and interpretation of data in the missile and space field. The  
original concept of a center which would provide guidance to  
collection facilities as well as analytic efforts [ ] was  
abandoned, and CIA's decision to go ahead with a center exclu-  
sively concerned with research analysis was communicated to  
[ ] by the DCI in August 1964. The subject was later  
discussed with Dr. Fubini later in August. Dr. Fubini did not  
appear to challenge the right of CIA to establish a center for  
this purpose but made a plea for what he characterized as  
"controlled competition on the field." In a memorandum, dated  
26 November 1964, the DCI formally advised the Secretary of  
Defense that he had created within CIA a center responsible for  
"the all-source collation and analysis of all data on Soviet missile  
and space firings."

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3. As a result of this memorandum Dr. Fubini later  
informally communicated three questions concerning the proposed  
activities of FMSAC as follows:

a. What are the required tasks which are not now being performed?

b. What are the required tasks which are not now being performed satisfactorily, and in which improvement cannot be accomplished by modifications of arrangements or reprogramming of effort in being prior to the CIA Center?

c. What are the specific tasks for which there is DoD and CIA agreement that duplication produces a net advantage in improved finished intelligence?

4. During a conference at which the foregoing questions were subject of discussion by Drs. Wheelon and Fubini, General Carroll, myself and others, it was agreed that the Defense Department would complete an inventory of existing facilities under the control of the Defense Department to perform tasks envisaged for FMSAC. This inventory has now been completed and is under review by representatives of DD/S&T. I am informed that the recommendations attached to this study in effect propose the creation of a center substantially similar to FMSAC to be located, however, under the general jurisdiction of DoD.

5. In announcing his decision to create FMSAC, the DCI stated that he was acting pursuant to his statutory obligation "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" (Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947). This section of the law clearly conveys authority on the DCI to proceed with the type of data analysis contemplated for FMSAC whether or not some other component of the Government is also doing it. As a practical matter, if the existence of competitive facilities in the Defense Department suggests a

serious problem of duplication with FMSAC, the DCI is probably under some obligation to submit the matter for review by the NSC under Section 102(d)(3).

6. The Bureau of the Budget takes a somewhat equivocal position on this matter as follows:

"... We are prepared to accept the proposition that the DCI needs to have a capability for independent substantive assessments of such an important area of national security as foreign missile and space capabilities, and, further, that in order effectively to coordinate and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities, he needs to have qualified staff to provide technical advice. At the same time, I think we must recognize the priority responsibility of the Department of Defense in such a matter as foreign missile capabilities. . . I urge that the Agency work closely with Defense in seeking to keep duplicative analysis, particularly that performed on external contract, to a minimum." (Letter from Mr. Amory to Mr. Kirkpatrick, dated 10 February 1964.)

Alternatives.

7. Given the DCI's statutory responsibilities, alternatives appear to be as follows:

a. Continue with FMSAC as presently constituted while requesting the Secretary of Defense to cease and desist competitive activity.

b. Continue with FMSAC under the direction of DD/S&T, inviting participation from DoD. (Under this arrangement I would see no objection to the creation of a board of advisors as recommended by Dr. Fubini and General Carroll to the Secretary of Defense.)

c. Propose consolidation of FMSAC with elements of the Defense Department to be constituted under a Director under an arrangement somewhat comparable to NPIC.

d. Accept the DoD proposal to participate in a center developing under the control of the Defense Department.

e. Postpone any decision pending further developments.

8. Personally, I recommend the course suggested in alternative b.

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

cc: DDCI  
DD/S&T